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Another Freedom: The Alternative History of an Idea. By Svetlana Boym. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010. xiii, 360 pp. Notes. Index. Illustrations. 
Photographs. $35.00, hard bound.
There is much to admire in this fascinating book. Svetlana Boym, a scholar of 
Russian literature, takes on questions of politics and law, thereby bringing litera-
ture and art generally and Russian literature in particular into arenas where they 
are at best tolerated, but more often studiously avoided. Boym challenges schol-
ars to engage in “passionate thinking” (25) about literary works and provides 
a model of how to do so. Through her readings of Euripides, Aleksandr Push-
kin, Fedor Dostoevskii, Viktor Shklovskii, Anna Akhmatova, Osip Mandelshtam, 
Andrei Siniavskii, and Varlam Shalamov, coupled with her discussions of Alexis 
de Tocqueville, Soren Kierkegaard, Georg Simmel, Isaiah Berlin, and Hannah 
Arendt (not the complete list), she demonstrates that literary and artistic works 
have a robust capacity, not only to address the idea of freedom, but also to address 
readers performatively, by creating new public spaces and possibilities not already 
given by existing structures of power and authority. In a bold and signiﬁ cant ges-
ture, this book afﬁ rms freedom, which leading theoreticians in the latter part of 
the twentieth century, including Stanley Fish, Michel Foucault, Slavoj Ž ižek, and 
Giorgio Agamben, have almost rejected as an impossible illusion. Boym counters 
this argument with the claim that, as Arendt puts it, freedom is “inﬁ nitely improb-
able” (4) but nonetheless possible.
The key terms worldliness, adventure, and the third way, provide an open-
ended framework for Boym’s wide-ranging reﬂ ections. Worldliness (which Boym 
takes from Arendt) signiﬁ es the rejection of apocalypticism or messianism of 
any kind; on the positive side, it means a commitment to the limited, fallible, 
unpredictable plurality of human existence grounded in historical reality and 
beyond mere biological survival. Worldliness thus in some ways corresponds to 
the life of the citizen, although it is not limited to civic duty. Adventure elaborates 
and develops freedom beyond the merely civic or political realm to include love, 
pleasure, play, and any encounter that has the potential to be transformative. 
The third way, ﬁ ttingly, is a bit more difﬁ cult to pin down; Boym uses the term 
to suggest variously an alternative to both authoritarianism and revolution, the 
space between nostalgia and modernity, and estrangement for, and not from the 
world (204). The autonomy of art and the practice of criticism represent some of 
the dimensions of “the third way.” This conceptual framework creates a tension 
(which could be explored more deeply) between the singularity and solitude of 
adventure, whether in art or love, and sociality and plurality, which are the sine 
qua non of worldliness.
Each chapter opens a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary dialogue in which 
visual art (including the author’s own), literature, and philosophy confront the 
problem of freedom. Boym uses the myth of Prometheus and The Bacchae to dis-
cuss the relation among civic life, madness, art, and religion. The chapter title, 
“the corruption of sacriﬁ ce” remains unclear, however, and not only because it 
suggests the possibility of an uncorrupt form of sacriﬁ ce. The rejection of sacri-
ﬁ ce in the story of the binding of Isaac and the ﬁ guration of Jesus as the perfect 
sacriﬁ ce are missing from this account; the view of sacriﬁ ce in the Hebrew Bible 
and the New Testament additionally could have served as a point of departure for 
the discussion of Mandelshtam and Franz Kafka. Boym harshly criticizes art and 
politics that venerate sacriﬁ cial victims or promote manic enthusiasm of any kind, 
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favoring instead “the transformation of violence and sacriﬁ ce into the ambivalent 
space of storytelling” (55).
Boym emphasizes ambivalence in her analysis of Pushkin and Tocqueville. 
Pushkin demanded one right above all others—“the right to ambivalence . . . an 
apolitical inner freedom not inscribed in any constitution” (89). Even though 
Boym writes in her conclusion that “the quest for inner freedom was not indepen-
dent from public architecture” (292), and even though she admonishes others, 
including Foucault and Agamben, for not distinguishing between totalitarianism 
and democracy, her emphasis throughout the study on the apolitical realm sug-
gests a zero-sum game in which outer freedom precludes alternative freedoms. 
What sort of external furniture of rights and limited government result in more 
or less tolerance of ambivalence?
Boym also shows, on the other hand, that narrative and ambivalence are 
not always on the same side. As she makes clear, in Demons Dostoevskii exposes 
the narrative’s capacity to transform its audience into enthusiastic believers in 
absolute values. She writes that in Dostoevskii’s work more broadly we see “the 
transformation of political violence into the philosophy of suffering that be-
comes a proof of authenticity and a foundation of moral authority” (107). In 
Russia’s Legal Fictions (1998), I argued similarly that storytelling does not nec-
essarily create multiple meanings but may also trade in compulsion and vio-
lence. Chapter 4, “Dostoevsky’s Diary: A Child Is Being Beaten,” shows how Dos-
toevskii used child abuse cases and the ﬁ ctions he subsequently created about 
their protagonists, together with his own witnessing of corporal punishment in 
Siberia to engender his authority as son of and father to Russia. Symbolic pro-
cesses and verbal narrative can thus serve to mask suffering, transforming vio-
lence into a foundational moment. Boym’s discussion of Dostoevskii retraces this 
ground.
One of the strongest discussions of alternative freedom comes in chapter 5, 
“Dissent, Estrangement, and the Ruins of Utopia.” Bringing Shklovskii into 
Arendt’s orbit should inspire readers to a new appreciation of the importance 
of his work beyond formalism. Boym makes the crucially important point that 
Shklovskii’s concept of estrangement is not only about creating new forms of 
art but, more fundamentally, about producing a new relation to the world and 
therefore represents, not a turn away from, but instead a return to a creative 
new engagement with the world. Arendt is a key ﬁ gure in this study; Boym dis-
cusses her in relation to Martin Heidegger (chapter 4), the Kantianism which she 
shares with Shklovskii (chapter 5), on totalitarianism and Nazism (chapter 6), 
and elsewhere. More systematic discussion of Arendt’s fundamental ideas would 
have been helpful.
In light of the corporatization of the university, and the pressure on the arts 
and humanities to prove their usefulness (and capacity to generate revenue), 
this is a good moment to afﬁ rm that art and literature provide the capacity for 
transformation and discovery that are both unpredictable and irreducible to ide-
ology and politics. Boym’s point about the importance of literature as a source 
of classic liberalism, as opposed to “polls and policies” (292) is well taken. The 
shift in perspective, the moment of realization, however, can also come from the 
civic realm. The O. J. Simpson trial, according to Boym, like the proliferation 
of Internet companies in Silicon Valley, was one of many events of the 1990s 
that “distracted” Americans from the “non-virtual events in the world” (290). 
For many Americans, however, the trial was not merely a televised car chase. It 
was rather an unsettling moment of estrangement in Shklovskii’s sense, because 
it challenged assumptions about American culture, revealing the huge chasm 
between whites and blacks.
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In this study art generally trumps politics. The argument, however, sometimes 
avoids the role of violence in producing and constraining the cultural forms that 
Boym represents as a noble alternative to politics. For example, Boym, using the 
ﬁ ndings of the anthropologist Aby Warburg, suggests that the Hopi opted out of 
institution building: “the road to dignity doesn’t move toward the formation of 
political institutions in the Western sense of the word but to a staging of elective 
afﬁ nities between human, animal, and the divine through symbolic practices” 
(58). The road to dignity, however, might have taken a different turn if the Hopi 
had not been forced onto reservations by the U.S. government. There is an-
other episode where Boym’s understated response to violence is disconcerting. 
She recounts the scandal created by an exhibit of the artwork This Is My Blood in 
Moscow in 2003. The vandals who destroyed the art were brieﬂ y taken into cus-
tody, while the Duma passed a law to punish the artist and the museum director. 
One of the deputies who voted against the measure was subsequently murdered. 
Boym notes that the government’s failure to uphold the importance of legal in-
stitutions contributed to the “scandal around the exhibit” (252). She mentions 
the death of Sergei Iushenkov, the dissenting Duma deputy, but offers no other 
response—from the realm of art or politics—to this act of violence.
Discussing alternative freedoms while avoiding the histories of violence that 
necessitated them requires a difﬁ cult balance, which elsewhere in her study Boym 
succeeds beautifully at maintaining, but not in these two cases. Her discussion 
of Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales, for example, masterfully keeps the violence of the 
camps at the front and center of the discussion, showing how Shalamov refuses 
to aestheticize it or turn it into the source of personal transformation. Boym 
ﬁ nds in Shalamov’s style and use of repetition a challenge to the basic premise of 
communication; violence enters language and remains there incapable of being 
assimilated, as she points out, and as I would add, because it is the precondition 
of this language.
In her admirable discussion of Akhmatova and Isaiah Berlin, Boym speaks 
positively of the philosopher’s concept of negative freedom “not reducible to 
political rights” (99). In the winter of 2011, hundreds of thousands of individuals 
in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere took to the streets demanding their rights and 
an end to years of humiliation at the hand of ganglike governments. It is too early 
to foreclose on rights, something that Boym’s study veers towards.
This tendency is perplexing, given her admiration for Arendt, for whom the 
“right to have rights,” including the right to belong to an “organized community” 
is an essential element of human freedom (Origins of Totalitarianism, 297). Boym 
provides an alternative picture of Arendt that makes the political less important. 
This is her right, and it is ﬁ tting for a book about the value of art and literature in 
providing alternative freedoms. In Knight’s Move, a collection of essays originally 
published in Russia from 1919 to 1923, Shklovskii observes “the fact that we write 
articles on Schiller and Sterne, solving problems anew, is a miracle” (46). Another 
Freedom rightly afﬁ rms this miracle.
Harriet Murav
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Ed. György Péteri. Pitt 
Series in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 2010. vi, 330 pp. Notes. Illustrations. $27.95, paper.
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Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc. Ed. David Crowley and 
Susan E. Reid. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010. vii, 348 pp. 
Notes. Illustrations. Photographs. Tables. $79.95, hard bound.
What was socialist about socialist consumption in the Soviet Union and other east-
ern bloc countries? How much could they accommodate luxury, and how was 
one to distinguish ordinary from luxurious goods and practices? Did the criteria 
replicate those of the capitalist west or was there an attempt to create an alterna-
tive system of values? Was there a “west” within the east when it came to cultural 
standards and afﬁ nities? It might seem astonishing to realize how little serious 
discussion scholars of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe generated about 
these questions until quite recently. But that is only a reﬂ ection of how rapidly 
and thoroughly thematic interests and approaches have shifted over the past de-
cade or so. The publication of the two collections of essays under review is, in any 
case, to be applauded, for together they signiﬁ cantly advance our understanding 
of the experience of living in really existing socialism and how much of the west 
was part of that experience.
These two books are in conversation with each other and not only because 
they share four authors in common. Both partake of the cultural turn in history, 
although each takes a somewhat different approach to cultural history. Imagin-
ing the West is primarily about “symbolic geographies” and “mental mapping” (2). 
Several years ago, its editor György Péteri used the metaphor of a “nylon curtain” 
to introduce a series of papers on “transnational and transsystemic” cultural ten-
dencies in Soviet Russia and east central Europe. The present volume expands 
upon this theme of mutual visibility and its impact on the “socialist way of life” in 
the east. Most of the contributions demonstrate how devilishly difﬁ cult it was to 
maintain “the integrity of the distinctive systemic identity of the state-socialist so-
cial order” (8) in the face of relentless imitativeness of standards, massive desire 
on the part of constituent populations for what they imagined the west provided 
in the way of a decent living, and not-so-massive but still considerable interaction 
with the west.
Pleasures in Socialism is coedited by David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, both of 
whom are represented with essays in Imagining the West. Like the other two collec-
tions of essays they coedited (Style and Socialism, 2000; Socialist Spaces, 2002), Plea-
sures in Socialism takes an archeological approach to its subject, analyzing certain 
material objects and the practices of consuming them as essential to understand-
ing everyday life in the eastern bloc. Catherine Cooke wrote in the preface to 
Style and Socialism that to her, an architectural historian, the “materialized mani-
festations of such societies always seemed more revealing and enduring descrip-
tors of their attributes and tensions than the ephemera of properly ‘political’ 
analysis.” Thanks to Crowley and Reid, the approach that—to continue quoting 
Cooke—takes “the fragment as a diagnostic site for exploring the condition of 
a whole system” (Style and Socialism, vii) has gained in adherents and potency in 
Soviet and east European studies over the past decade or so. The fragment at 
the center of Pleasures in Socialism is that “elusive phenomenon” (7) of pleasure. 
The editors identify pleasure with the categories of leisure and luxury (thereby 
implicitly excluding the possibility of it being derived from another quotidian 
activity—work). They relate leisure and luxury to shortage, privilege, popular 
expectations, fantasies, and other key dimensions of life under socialism. The 
choice of the preposition in the title is also worthy of note: “in” rather than “of” 
allows the contributors to explore pleasure that was experienced despite social-
ism as well as thanks to it.
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“Where, when, and how,” Crowley and Reid ask in their introduction, “did 
people acquire their sense of what constituted ‘normal’ entitlements to leisure 
and consumer goods? What role was played by the awareness of lifestyles in the 
West or, for that matter, other parts of the Bloc?” (17) These questions are ad-
dressed most forthrightly by Reid’s and Paulina Bren’s contributions—not to 
Pleasures in Socialism, but to Imagining the West. Reid, who has previously writ-
ten about the 1959 Nixon-Khrushchev “Kitchen debate” and the new source of 
political legitimation that domestic consumption provided Nikita Khrushchev, 
here argues that responses among Soviet visitors to the gadgetry displayed at the 
American National Exhibit were far more critical than the Americans had antici-
pated and some scholars have claimed. She attributes this, among other things, 
to certain expectations about exhibitions and what was proper to display at them, 
as well as skepticism about the emancipatory effects of labor-saving devices. Bren 
concerns herself with how the Czechoslovak government made use of lifestyle (as 
distinct from living standards) during the “normalization” following the Soviet-
led invasion of 1968. Even if it ultimately failed to dislodge the desire for western-
made goods, she argues, the encouragement of “self-realization” both within and 
outside the workplace created “an entirely new experience of communism in the 
1970s and 1980s, the impact of which is still felt today” (193).
Michael David-Fox, who provides a characteristically thoughtful conclusion 
to Imagining the West, has written elsewhere about “entangling modernities.” In 
this volume entanglements come in all shapes and sizes. Greg Castillo’s chapter 
on home design in the 1950s weaves an intricate argument about the appro-
priation by the east (in this case the German Democratic Republic [GDR]) of 
western cultural achievements, reminding us in the process that “socialist realism 
established as its mission not the creation of an alternative to Western bourgeois 
culture but the distillation and arrogation of its progressive essence” (89). Music 
historian Elaine Kelly uses Richard Wagner as an example of how the two Ger-
manys struggled over their common cultural heritage, with Bayreuth and Des-
sau each claiming to be the legitimate heir. Polish architects in David Crowley’s 
sympathetic treatment traveled quite literally between Paris and Moscow and 
ﬁ guratively between a capitalist west that used to represent the future but now 
ﬁ gured as the past and a Soviet east whose modernity had outstripped that of the 
capitalist west. Cultural misperceptions went both ways in Catriona Kelly’s less 
sympathetic analysis of Soviet assertions of superiority in defense of children’s 
rights, and in Barbara Walker’s interpretation of encounters between Soviet dis-
sidents and U.S. journalists. Finally, Anne E. Gorsuch reads several Soviet ﬁ lms 
of the Khrushchev era as indicative of an optimism about the USSR’s ability to 
absorb western inﬂ uences—including those of its own west, Estonia—that would 
peter out under Leonid Brezhnev.
Imagining the West is chronologically diffuse. Two essays, by Karen Gammel-
gaard and Erik Ingebrigsten, concern east central Europeans’ relations with Rus-
sia and the west before the communist era. There are also occasional references 
to more recent times, including Castillo’s observation that “perhaps the most 
surprising cultural development associated with the collapse of Communism has 
been the romantic rediscovery of its consumer culture” (103). This was nowhere 
more evident than in Germany where throughout the 1990s “Ossies” and “Wes-
sies” alike indulged in Ostalgie. Ina Merkel has written extensively on this phe-
nomenon from an ethnographic standpoint; in Pleasures in Socialism she provides 
a political economy of consumption in the GDR that serves as a ﬁ tting framework 
for the other essays. These can be divided into three types: analyses of activities 
that fall within the category of leisure; those that use consumption and material 
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culture as a prism through which to view the peculiarities of mature state social-
ism, and those that pursue material “biographies.”
Leisure encompasses the “bikini boys” of Poland’s Nowa Huta (Katherine 
Lebow), what Soviet television programmers sought to provide viewers (Kristin 
Roth-Ey), and the hunting clubs and outings of Hungary’s political elite (György 
Péteri). In Lebow’s sensible interpretation, Poland’s “cultural hooligans” were 
not resisting communism but, like Alexei Yurchak’s informants from a later pe-
riod of the Soviet version, could be enthusiastic champions of it. In creating new 
identities for themselves, they were contributing to the destruction of the old 
prewar bourgeois identities that Stalinists also claimed to abhor. Roth-Ey’s tele-
vision programmers of the 1950s and 1960s were also intent on promoting new 
identities via fun and games, but within limits. Meanwhile, Hungary’s nomenklatura 
(which included the author’s father) was bagging deer, boar, and other game, 
thereby engaging in an exclusive form of recreation that Péteri argues repre-
sented a nonmonetary dividend to the party-state apparatus.
Three essays—Paulina Bren’s on a Czechoslovak television program that pro-
moted women as reliably moderate consumers; Larissa Zakharova’s on the Soviet 
fashion industry; and Josie McLellan’s on East German erotica—are wonderful 
examples of how gender analysis can be brought to bear on political economy. I 
personally found Bren’s characterization of the shop assistant as the “vanguard 
of socialism” (189) priceless. The remaining essays are all indebted in one way 
or another to the approach that Africanist anthropologist—how’s that for trans-
nationalism!—Igor Kopytoff called in 1986 “the cultural biography of things.” 
The things here include Soviet champagne, clothes designed by fashion houses, 
and cars ( Jukka Gronow and Sergei Zhuravlev); camping equipment in the GDR 
(Scott Moranda); Bulgarian cigarettes (Mary Neuburger); alcohol in Romania 
(Narcis Tulbure); and furs in the USSR (Anna Tikhomirova). Each of these es-
says makes fascinating points transcending particularities of the objects whose 
biographies they tell. Both Gronow-Zhuravlev and Tikhomirova, for example, 
note the informal sumptuary codes in Soviet society according to which “luxury 
was not . . . ‘accessible to everybody’ but was attached to deﬁ nite ‘estates’” (300). 
Thanks to them as well I now know that having an atelier make a fur coat was 
nearly identical to getting one’s car repaired. All point to the dynamic of what 
once was considered a luxury eventually becoming a necessity as a no-win situa-
tion for respective regimes.
Together, these two volumes do a tremendous job of transnationalizing the 
history of the eastern bloc and offering a whole new perspective—that of luxury 
and leisure—through which to understand consumption and other dimensions 
of everyday life. They are so rewarding that only the foolish would ignore them.
Lewis H. Siegelbaum
Michigan State University
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. By Steven Lev-
itsky and Lucan A. Way. Problems of International Politics. Cambridge, Eng.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. xviii, 517 pp. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliog-
raphy. Index. Figures. Tables. $95.00, hard bound. $29.99, paper.
Comparative politics is the area of political science in which the tension between 
generalizing and particularizing is constant and omnipresent; it is, however, also 
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a source of creative ferment that generates increasingly sophisticated analyses of 
various phenomena. In an important subﬁ eld of democratization studies the the-
oretical tension between these two general types of inquiry has recently produced 
several fascinating studies and stimulating debates. A group of scholars who value 
parsimony and formalization over other analytical virtues offered highly inﬂ uen-
tial studies of democratization, focusing on the relationship between the econ-
omy and processes. The broadly debated exemplars include Adam Przeworski 
and his colleagues, Carles Boix, and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson.1 
On the other hand, scholars privileging detail over parsimony, context over (ex-
cessive) abstraction, and real historical time over timeless analytical matrices have 
also produced pathbreaking works. Here, the arguably most eloquent example 
has been recently provided by Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt.2
Steven Levitsky’s and Lucan A. Way’s Competitive Authoritarianism enters the 
debate on the side of mid-range theorizing with uncommon analytical ﬁ nesse 
and theoretical innovativeness. Levitsky and Way belong to the long and distin-
guished tradition of social science for which theoretical sophistication does not 
mean stripping the world of so many details that the resulting models achieve 
parsimonious elegance at the cost of vacuousness. This is the tradition of mid-
range theories pioneered by Robert Merton.
The book’s power rests on two innovations, one conceptual and one theoreti-
cal. The authors use a fresh concept, competitive authoritarianism, that became a 
part of the standard vocabulary in comparative politics almost immediately after 
they coined it in 2002.3 This concept is but one of several they offer in this work 
whose conceptual and deﬁ nitional work is exemplary in its precision and exhaus-
tiveness. The book also proposes a novel theory of regime change, challenging a 
number of standard theories that focus most commonly on economic correlates 
of democratization.
The authors deserve a place among the major innovators of comparative 
politics just for coining and elaborating the concept of competitive authoritari-
anism (CA). The existing literature is full of attempts to come to terms with the 
phenomenon observed in many parts of the world during the last two to three de-
cades: the emergence of hybrid political regimes that neither ﬁ t into the category 
of old-fashioned authoritarianisms nor can be sensibly classiﬁ ed as democracies. 
As a speciﬁ c kind of hybrid, competitive authoritarianism is a political system with 
regular elections, arbitrarily dished out doses of liberty, and uneven transparency 
of public contest (the oppositional forces are publically known and participate in 
the political process). The system is thus not fully authoritarian, but at the same 
time it lacks three attributes of democracy: (1) free elections, (2) broad protec-
tion of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing ﬁ eld. The deﬁ ciencies 
in these three areas are carefully deﬁ ned and classiﬁ ed. The introduction of the 
concept of an uneven playing ﬁ eld is a particularly noteworthy conceptual in-
novation. Many scholars have sensed the signiﬁ cance of the processes covered by 
1. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Li-
mongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950 –
1990 (Cambridge, Eng., 2000); Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge, Eng., 
2003); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democ-
racy (Princeton, 2006).
2. Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization 
Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” Comparative Political Studies 43, 
nos. 8–9 (August–September 2010): 931– 68.
3. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 51– 65.
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this concept and have danced around this problem area, but Levitsky and Way 
are the ﬁ rst to propose a bold conceptualization and to demand that the concept 
ﬁ gure centrally in our analyses of political regimes.
In addition to their signiﬁ cant contribution to the conceptual side of things, 
Levitsky and Way also propose bold innovations in the theory of regime transfor-
mations. The vast literature in this ﬁ eld is organized around two types of ques-
tions. First, scholars ask where the causality is primarily located, in agency (say, 
among the negotiating elites) or in structural preconditions. Second, they look 
for the theoretical “location” of causal factors of political change: are they in-
side (endogenous factors) or outside (exogenous factors) politics? There is a 
tendency to look outside and then the key causal variables are seen to be either 
economic (wealth, rate of growth, inequality) or sociocultural (political culture, 
traditions). Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan offered arguably the most inﬂ uential 
study of democratization (including important east European cases) that privi-
leges factors endogenous to politics; Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman 
are often cited as authors who skillfully analyze interactions between endogenous 
and exogenous variables.4 Both works have been broadly seen as exemplars of 
mid-range theorizing that pays equal attention to agency and structure and is 
based on richly textured, qualitative case studies.
Levitsky and Way not only continue this tradition but revolutionize its lan-
guage and arguments. Although they do not discover new factors omitted by 
others (given the scope and breadth of the existing scholarship that would be 
nearly impossible), they do offer fresh conceptualizations and ingenious new ar-
guments. Their theory shows how these factors work together in several differ-
ent sequences and constellations generating three distinct regime trajectories: 
democratization, stable authoritarianism, or unstable authoritarianism. The ana-
lytically parsimonious theory is built around three concepts: (1) linkage (to the 
west), (2) leverage (by the west), (3) the organizational power of incumbents. 
Although many scholars write about these issues—including the entrenchment 
of old elites and the international context—none of them offered a crisp analyti-
cal separation of the two distinct processes: linkage and leverage. This distinction 
is central to Levitsky’s and Way’s innovative theory.
Linkage is particularly important. Countries that are linked to the west 
through a variety of channels—economic, political, and cultural; formal and in-
formal; sustained rather than sporadic—democratize faster and more effectively. 
For example, in an inﬂ uential series of analyses, Linz, Stepan, and others have 
suggested that the postauthoritarian countries are better off choosing parliamen-
tary over presidential systems. Levitsky and Way challenge this recommendation 
by showing that among the 35 regimes classiﬁ ed as competitive authoritarian in 
the early 1990s, “13 of 29 presidential or semi-presidential regimes democratized 
between 1990 and 2008, compared to only 1 of 6 parliamentary regimes” (78). 
More important for their argument: “among high-linkage cases, all presidential 
regimes democratized” (78).
Other inﬂ uential theoretical competitors do not fare much better when 
confronted with the explanatory power of the theory presented by Levitsky and 
Way. There are three standard ways to operationalize the economic factors hy-
pothesized to play a role in democratization: wealth (the higher the gross na-
4. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, 1996); and Stephan 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, 
1995).
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tional product [GNP] per capita, the higher the chance of democratization), 
income inequality (the lower the level of inequality, the higher the likelihood 
of democratization), and economic performance, measured, say, by the rate of 
growth of GNP (the higher the rate of growth, the greater the likelihood of de-
mocratization). According to the authors, none of these three theories predicts 
the trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes as well as their own the-
ory based on a triad of concepts including linkage, leverage, and the power of 
incumbents.
It is, however, crucial to remember that Levitsky and Way, careful adherents 
of mid-range theories, offer a theory of political transformations for one par-
ticular regime type: competitive authoritarianism. Conveniently, however, since 
this regime type is plentiful in the postcommunist world, we learn a lot about 
the twenty years of momentous transformations in our region. But because com-
petitive authoritarian regimes account for a large and signiﬁ cant portion of the 
political map in 2011, those interested in other regions will proﬁ t as well.
The book’s scope is ambitiously comprehensive: the political trajectories of 
all regimes that were classiﬁ ed as competitive authoritarian in 1990 are analyzed. 
The project is designed as a disciplined panel study. Thirty-ﬁ ve countries that 
were classiﬁ ed as competitive authoritarian regimes in the 1990s are then coded 
again in 2008. There are twelve cases from our region. Six from eastern Eu-
rope: Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia; and six that 
emerged from the Soviet Union: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, 
and Ukraine. Three trajectories are discovered: competitive authoritarian lead-
ing to democracy, competitive authoritarian leading to unstable authoritarian-
ism, and competitive authoritarian leading to stable authoritarianism. Out of the 
thirty-ﬁ ve competitive authoritarian regimes, ﬁ fteen countries followed the ﬁ rst 
trajectory (six postcommunist), ten the second (four postcommunist), and ten 
the third (two postcommunist—Armenia and Russia).
The bulk of the book is devoted to careful description and analysis of the 
thirty-ﬁ ve cases. The authors’ mastery of the massive literature is awe-inspiring. 
Thanks to this exhaustive literature review, the book can easily serve as a refer-
ence work on competitive authoritarianisms.
The innovative conceptual apparatus is clearly laid out, conceptualizations 
and operationalizations are crisply spelled out (also in handy appendixes), and 
the coding is explicitly presented. I detected one problem: the somewhat un-
clear delineation of the relationship between two typologies: (1) regime type 
(democratic, competitive authoritarianism, full authoritarianism) and (2) the 
stability of authoritarianism (stable and unstable). The authors switch from one 
terminology to another. For example, Russia “through 2008” is referred to as a 
“stable competitive authoritarian regime” (186), while elsewhere it is classiﬁ ed as 
“Full AR” (370), that is, full authoritarian regime in 2008. The reader is some-
times left wondering whether a given country’s authoritarianism is, say, stable 
and competitive or stable and fully authoritarian. The authors are so pedantic 
in their conceptual work that it is hard not to think about four logically conceiv-
able types of regimes: stable full authoritarianisms, unstable full authoritarian-
isms, stable competitive authoritarianisms, and unstable competitive authoritari-
anisms. “Unstable full authoritarianism” is logically thinkable regardless of how 
(im)probable it is empirically. It would be useful to have this type discussed, at 
least as an extreme ideal type. More important, it would be helpful to have con-
sistency throughout the volume in distinguishing full authoritarianism and stable 
authoritarianism.
This is, however, a minor quibble. This conceptually innovative and theoreti-
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cally pathbreaking volume landed on the bookshelf devoted to classics of com-
parative politics classics almost instantaneously at its publication.
Jan Kubik
Rutgers University, New Brunswick
Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, 
Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia. By Stephen E. Hanson. Cambridge, 
Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2010. xxvi, 274 pp. Notes. Index. Tables. 
$90.00, hard bound. $26.99, paper.
Stephen E. Hanson has written a very stimulating book seeking to explain how 
ideology plays a central role in the formation of successful parties in times of 
uncertainty. Arguing that ideology has been much undervalued in scholarly at-
tempts to explain party formation, Hanson substantiates his argument through 
three case studies: France of the Third Republic (1870– 86), Weimar Germany 
(1918–34), and post-Soviet Russia (1992–2008). His argument is framed by a 
combination of Weberian analysis and rational choice, with one of his stated aims 
being to revive the use of Max Weber’s work as a major tool of analysis in social 
science, something he believes has declined in recent years.
Hanson’s basic argument is that in times of considerable uncertainty (prin-
cipally but not solely concerning the rules of the political game), political actors 
will tend to seek to acquire short-term beneﬁ ts at the expense of long-term pay-
offs. This means they will eschew the hard work of institution building in favor 
of short-term compromises to make immediate gains. In practice, this means 
that instead of committing to the building up of a political party, and thereby 
acting collectively, they are likely to strike out on their own with little concern for 
the institutional consequences of such actions. Mobilizing the Weberian notion 
of value rationality, Hanson argues that one means of overcoming this propen-
sity to give priority to short-term instrumental goals over longer-term beneﬁ ts is 
through the development of ideology. In his view, ideology “elongates the time 
horizon” (48) by committing adherents to values that are seen as “timeless” (49); 
the contingency of immediate instrumental action is thereby superseded by con-
nection with the longer-term values embodied in the ideology. This means that 
“ideological” parties are more likely to survive and prosper than “nonideological” 
(sometimes called “pragmatic”) parties. The case studies show that of the sixteen 
parties present in the times of most uncertainty in each country, only one (the 
Catholic Center Party in Germany) did not ﬁ t this argument; all eight “ideo-
logical” parties were organizational successes (meaning they were able to gain 
and maintain signiﬁ cant parliamentary representation) while seven of the eight 
“nonideological” parties were organizational failures.
The basic argument that ideological commitment can assist party building 
and stabilization is, in my view, unquestionable, and the case studies bear this 
out. Those parties in which a clear and coherent ideological position was estab-
lished tended to do better than those without such a position. Indeed, I am a 
little surprised that Hanson argues that this is not a mainstream position. More 
questionable are some of the assumptions behind the methodology that Hanson 
uses, explanation of which takes up a third of the book.
The ﬁ rst is the notion within which the whole argument is cast, that of “post-
imperial democracies.” These are deﬁ ned as follows: “a new democratic regime 
is born within the core nation of a formally imperial polity immediately after 
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its disintegration, and where reasonably fair and open democratic elections are 
held for at least a decade after imperial collapse” (xxii). Given the case studies, 
two aspects of this deﬁ nition appear problematic. First, it seems perverse to label 
Third Republic France “post-imperial” when, as Hanson acknowledges, it en-
gaged in the building of a “powerful colonial empire” (88). Was it both imperial 
and postimperial? How is this to be reconciled? Second, the description of the 
Russian elections of the 1990s as “reasonably fair and open” is one with which 
many would disagree. As international observers reported, they may have been 
free, but they certainly were not fair, and the book acknowledges this, at least in 
regard to the 1996 election. What these two issues suggest is that two of the three 
case studies do not actually ﬁ t the description of them given in the book’s title 
and at various places in the text. This is odd, but fortunately not central to the 
analysis.
A second question relates to the deﬁ nition of ideology used in the book. 
Ideology is deﬁ ned as “proposals . . . to deﬁ ne clear and consistent criteria for 
membership in a proposed polity” (xix). Hanson argues that this is a much better 
deﬁ nition of ideology than any of the others that have been in common usage, 
in particular that of worldview or Weltanschauung, which has been prominent in 
the literature. Yet Hanson’s deﬁ nition is, by itself, not very useful; for example, it 
effectively turns rules of citizenship into an ideology. This is unnecessarily restric-
tive and, as Hanson himself shows, cannot be sustained. An ideology will usually 
include some notion of who can be members of the polity, but this is usually ex-
pressed in terms of what that polity should be like, how it should be constructed 
and operate, and what it stands for. And this is the heart of notions of ideology as 
worldview. If Hanson had openly recognized that his narrow conception of polity 
membership was part of a broader conception of the future society, the apparent 
exception to his rule (the Catholic Center Party) would not be an exception, and 
his discussion of successful parties like the French Republicans, German Nazis, 
and Russian communists would not be at odds with the basic deﬁ nition of ideol-
ogy with which he is seeking to work. The ideology that he discusses in the case 
of all three parties is clearly much broader than his deﬁ nition would allow and 
shows that that deﬁ nition is not particularly useful for his analysis.
A third issue concerns the clear distinction drawn between the “ideological” 
and the “nonideological”/“pragmatic” individual and party. While Hanson does 
at times say that he is working with ideal types, the sharpness of this distinction 
injects a sense of unreality into his analysis. People are rarely driven just by ideo-
logical motives or act purely pragmatically without any concern for wider values. 
In practice, both individuals’ and parties’ actions will usually be a result of some 
combination of ideological and pragmatic concerns. No electoral party is with-
out an ideology. It may be underdeveloped, not well thought-out or articulated, 
and not presented in programmatic form, but it must go to the voters with some 
sense of what it stands for. Hanson’s own analysis suggests that this is the case, as 
his discussion of many of the unsuccessful parties shows that they did articulate 
views about what should happen in the society, even if those views were vague 
and relatively unformed. The issue is best seen, not in terms of whether a party is 
“ideological” or not, but how clearly formulated its ideological position is; even 
United Russia purports to stand for something.
A fourth question relates to the rational choice assumption that Hanson 
makes, that in times of uncertainty, as individuals seek their own short-term goals, 
people are less likely to band together for longer-term aims. This may be accurate 
in some cases, but clearly not in all. An equally logical argument could be con-
structed to the effect that in times of uncertainty, people are more likely to act 
together than to go it alone. When confronted with adversity, pooling resources 
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would seem to be at least as logical as striking out alone. If so, this means that the 
collective action problem that Hanson sets out to solve is not always present.
Finally, there is the question of party organization. Hanson acknowledges 
that ideology alone cannot produce party success; a range of other factors can 
be important, including party organization. But whereas some consider organi-
zation to be the key to party survival, Hanson downplays its role. The problem 
is that the argument does not appreciate the role that organization plays in the 
successful mobilization of ideology. A party’s ideology can be successful only if 
it unites party members and appeals to potential voters. Party organization is 
a major vehicle for the projection (and sometimes development) of the party 
ideology, especially in those situations where there is not wide access to unbiased 
media. In the 1996 Russian election, where media bias against the communists 
was extreme, the party had to rely on its own resources to get its message across, 
and it was a tribute to the party’s organizational network that it was able to garner 
the level of votes that it did. Ideology without organization would be likely to be 
as unsuccessful as organization without ideology.
Fortunately these criticisms do not devalue the basic argument about the im-
portance of ideology for party development. That case is well made through the 
case studies, and although there will be aspects of those case studies that people 
will disagree with—for example, the downplaying of the importance of the per-
sonal roles of Léon Gambetta and Adolf Hitler in party development, and the 
high level of coherence attributed to the ideology of the Communist Party of 
the Russian Federation— overall they are generally excellent. They are the heart 
of a book that makes a major contribution to our understanding of these three 
case studies and shows the value of comparative historical research. It is recom-
mended for everyone interested in the issues of party formation as well as the 
course of development in these three countries.
Graeme Gill
University of Sydney, Australia
Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment. By Stephen 
Kotkin, with a contribution by Jan T. Gross. New York: Modern Library, 2010. 
xxviii, 197 pp. Notes. Chronology. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. Maps. 
$24.00, hard bound. $16.00, paper.
Stephen Kotkin is the author of Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (1995), 
a magniﬁ cent social history of the creation of the industrial city of Magnitogorsk, 
as well as Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970 –2000 (2001). Jan T. Gross 
is well known, both for his work on the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, and 
for his recent turn to issues of Polish-Jewish relations during World War II and its 
aftermath. The book does not make clear the extent of Gross’s involvement, so I 
will treat Kotkin as the author.
Kotkin attacks what he calls the “civil society utopia” theory of 1989. In short, 
“‘civil society’ could not have shattered Soviet-style socialism for the simple rea-
son that civil society in Eastern Europe did not then actually exist” (7). Kotkin’s 
alternative explanation lies with “uncivil society” or how party-state elites were 
incapable of coping with the reform efforts launched by Mikhail Gorbachev and 
the unrest these efforts unleashed. They could neither adapt nor repress, so they 
were swept away. In Kotkin’s estimation, it was not civil society that swept them 
away but the power of spontaneous unorganized crowds.
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In assigning Gorbachev the responsibility for what transpired in eastern Eu-
rope, Kotkin is not alone among Russian historians (see also Archie Brown, The Rise 
and Fall of Communism, 2009). The decomposition of the Soviet bloc is seemingly un-
connected to its own turbulent history, which was punctuated by a series of threaten-
ing crises from the outset (the Tito-Stalin split, East Berlin in 1953, the Hungarian 
Revolution in 1956, the Poznan´ March in 1956, the Polish October in 1956, the 
Albanian break with the USSR in 1961, the Prague Spring in 1968, March 1968 in 
Poland, the Baltic coast strikes of 1970, the Ł ódz´ strikes of 1971, the Radom-Ursus 
Strikes of 1976, the strikes in the Jiu Valley of 1977, the whole period of opposition 
and Solidarity in Poland from 1976 –1989, and the Brasov strikes of 1987). Imagine 
a history of the end of the British empire that afforded such a singular place to 
Mountbatten. This is a top-down view, in which those who put their necks on the 
line are written out of history and the party-state is responsible for the construction 
of the system as well as its demise forty years later. The antidote to such a perspective 
is the work of historians like Padraic Kenney who highlights the role of the opposi-
tion in the events of 1989 (A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe, 1989, 2002).
As a political scientist who has written two deeply historical books, I have 
grown used to historians not fully appreciating that my work pursues social sci-
ence questions using historical evidence. It is now my turn to hoist the other dis-
cipline on our petard and argue that Uncivil Society suffers from a lack of attention 
to the social science literature on civil society and democratization, as well as the 
perspective that comparative historical analysis in the social sciences brings to 
issues of inference and evidence.
The structure of inference and evidence in Uncivil Society is based on a three-
case comparison—East Germany, Romania, and Poland. The three cases are 
treated dichotomously in terms of whether civil society was a consequent actor in 
the collapse of communism. If one accepts this conceptualization of the problem, 
and accepts the coding of cases as correct, the uncivil society explanation does 
not work. In Kotkin’s coding, civil society was the driving force in Poland, whereas 
in the two others the social force that brought down the regime was “spontane-
ous” protest. In those latter two cases the evidence of uncivil society—a party-
state elite unable to either reform or repress is strong. In Poland Kotkin allows 
for greater uncertainty about whether the party-state was unable to repress or 
reform. But this case can be characterized with even greater certainty. Poland’s 
track record demonstrated that it was capable of repression—1956, 1968, 1970, 
1976, and especially 1981. And it was also a bloc leader in innovative reform as 
well—national communism in 1956, import-led modernization in the 1970s, and 
the convening of roundtable negotiations with the opposition in 1988. This body 
of evidence means that neither the civil society utopia nor the uncivil society 
dystopia is a necessary or sufﬁ cient cause for the collapse of the regimes. The evi-
dence marshaled in the book thus does not support its main argument. Instead it 
supports the proposition that there are two distinct paths out of communism.
Given that Kotkin propounds a regional theory of democratic change using 
case comparisons, it is reasonable to expect he would look at the existing litera-
ture on this sort of thing. Social scientists have been working on such themes for 
over thirty years. The literature on democratization has long argued that the role 
of civil society in democratic transition is not uniform. Initially it was argued that 
Third Wave democratization was a top-down phenomenon in which liberalization 
by authoritarian incumbents allowed for a “resurrection of civil society” where 
pressure from below could extend authoritarian openings into democratic transi-
tions (see Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, 1986, 48–56). Some of us also argued that transition 
could be civil society driven, that pressure from below could cause a split in the 
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authoritarian elite that would in turn trigger liberalization. But in both instances 
it is important to understand that civil society gains strength with liberalization in 
countries that successfully democratize. So even if civil society were considerably 
weaker in every other place in east central Europe in comparison to Poland, it 
does not mean that it was irrelevant.
From the perspective of this literature it is unrealistic to conceptualize the 
state– civil society relation as ﬁ xed in transition. Kotkin’s either/or coding seems 
plausible only due to a limited selection of cases. First, his sample includes two 
polar opposites: Poland, with its fourteen-year history of organized opposition 
(1976 – 89), and Romania, with its harsh neo-Stalinist dictatorship. He omits most 
of the cases that fall between these two extremes. Second, East Germany is a case 
on the lower-middle end of this spectrum. Though more developed than either 
Romania or Bulgaria, it lagged behind Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. 
East Germany is also a problematic case in that what transpired in November 
1989 was overtaken by other events.
A comparison of Czechoslovakia and East Germany is illustrative of the dif-
ﬁ culties this poses. Both had smaller oppositions of several thousand activists who 
engaged the state on human rights, ecological, and peace issues. In Czechoslo-
vakia, the ability to call out protests seems to have been advancing faster than in 
East Germany. It was the repression of a student demonstration in Prague that 
started events moving there. In East Germany, the opposition activists who orga-
nized the original Monday demonstrations in Leipzig played a fundamental role 
in bringing down the regime. It was also the New Forum, an umbrella group of 
opposition activists who negotiated with the regime at the roundtable that led 
to democratic elections. In Czechoslovakia the support of the crowds for Civic 
Forum and Public against Violence was more effectively channeled toward forc-
ing the regime to concede power and calling for elections. In East Germany the 
intervention of West German politicians displaced the opposition and channeled 
the broader movement into support for uniﬁ cation rather than East German de-
mocratization. In East Germany both the party-elite and the opposition ceased 
to count for much. For that reason, its inclusion in this study does not provide 
much in terms of inference.
In my view, the impact of civil society in each country is better understood 
from the perspective of the balance of power between the party-state and the op-
position in relative terms (e.g., in Poland, it took a strong civil society to overcome 
an elite that had not fully lost its capacity to repress or reform). All things being 
equal, it is in those countries in which oppositional civil society groups were more 
developed at the point of transition or where such groups were able to channel 
the pressure afforded by mass mobilization that the prospects for democratic 
change were strongest. Twenty years later the postcommunist countries that have 
made the greatest progress toward a liberal democratic market society—Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltics, and Slovenia—are also those 
whose oppositions placed the greatest pressure on party-state elites at the point of 
transition. In those countries in which communism collapsed without the coun-
tervailing power of a civil society, or mass mobilization channeled by oppositional 
civil society organizations, the uncivil society that Kotkin decries was able to hold 
onto power (e.g., Central Asia, Belarus, and Russia). Those are the countries in 
which we see neo-authoritarianism, stalled transition, semidemocracy, and the 
concentration of economic assets in the hands of the members of the power elite. 
This, above all, is the best evidence that civil society has real material force.
Michael Bernhard
University of Florida
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